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Abstract
One of the goals of the US Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS) Act of 2009,
more commonly known as ‘Cash for Clunkers’, was to improve the US vehicle fleet fuel
efficiency. Previous studies of the program’s environmental impact have focused mainly on the
effect of improved fuel economy, and the resulting reductions in fuel use and emissions during
the vehicle use phase. We propose and apply a method for analyzing the net effect of CARS on
greenhouse gas emissions from a full vehicle life cycle perspective, including the impact of
premature production and retirement of vehicles. We find that CARS had a one-time effect of
preventing 4.4 million metric tons of CO2-equivalent emissions, about 0.4% of US annual
light-duty vehicle emissions. Of these, 3.7 million metric tons are avoided during the period of
the expected remaining life of the inefficient ‘clunkers’. 1.5 million metric tons are avoided as
consumers purchase vehicles that are more efficient than their next replacement vehicle would
otherwise have been. An additional 0.8 million metric tons are emitted as a result of premature
manufacturing and disposal of vehicles. These results are sensitive to the remaining lifetime of
the ‘clunkers’ and to the fuel economy of new vehicles in the absence of CARS, suggesting
important considerations for policymakers deliberating on the use of accelerated vehicle
retirement programs as a part of the greenhouse gas emissions policy.
Keywords: greenhouse gases, accelerated vehicle retirement, life cycle analysis, car allowance
rebate system
1. Introduction
1.1. Cash for Clunkers program overview
In June 2009, the US Congress passed the Consumer
Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS) Act, also known as
the Car Allowance Rebate System or, more commonly, Cash
for Clunkers. Under the program rules, consumers traded in
qualifying vehicles—passenger cars or light trucks getting less
than 18 miles per gallon (mpg) and less than 25 years old—
and received a $3500 or $4500 rebate toward the purchase of
a new, more fuel-efficient vehicle. Retired vehicles were then
destroyed, permanently removing them from the US vehicle
fleet. By the time the $3 billion in funding was exhausted in
August, nearly 700 000 old vehicles had been traded in and
new ones purchased [1]. The program was expected to provide
economic benefits to consumers and the struggling economy,
and to benefit the environment by removing some of the least
fuel-efficient vehicles from the road [2].
1.2. Accounting for emissions benefits in the existing literature
1.2.1. Literature on CARS. Public communication
about CARS frequently emphasized the program’s expected
environmental benefits. President Obama released a statement
after the program’s first week, lauding its ‘environmental
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Figure 1. Separate fuel and vehicle production and disposal cycles are used to evaluate the total vehicle life cycle impact.
benefits well beyond what was originally anticipated’ [3].
Estimates of the program’s environmental impact, and in
particular the effect on fuel consumption and greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, have been made prior to and since its
conclusion. Abrams and Parsons [4, 5] and Sachs [6] used the
average fuel economy of scrapped and new vehicles to estimate
savings of about 280 gallons of gasoline per vehicle per year
it would have remained on the road in the absence of CARS.
Abrams and Parsons estimated scrapped vehicles would have
been driven an additional three years, and Sachs assumed five
years, implying total savings ranging from 840 to 1400 gallons
per vehicle, or about 570–950 million gallons total. Knittel [7]
similarly analyzed the program’s effect on GHG emissions,
and he also considered the benefits from reduction of criteria
pollutants. For its report to Congress on the results of CARS,
the Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) [8] estimated total savings
of 823 million gallons of gasoline, or just under 9.5 million
metric tons of CO2-equivalent (CO2-e) emissions (including
those from gasoline combustion and upstream impacts from
fuel extraction, processing, and distribution). The net effect
of CARS on GHG emissions, however, is also influenced by
factors other than the improvements in fuel economy. The
program encouraged early retirement of functional vehicles,
and by extension, moved forward in time the production of
new vehicles; both the disposal and manufacture of vehicles
contributes to GHG emissions. We believe that a life cycle
assessment, which takes this fact into account, would provide
a more accurate accounting of the GHG emissions impact of
CARS.
1.2.2. Literature on accelerated vehicle retirement programs.
Accelerated vehicle retirement programs (also known as
scrappage programs) like CARS have been used for several
decades. Most of the literature on the environmental impacts
of such programs focuses mainly on the reduced emissions
during vehicle operation (e.g., [9–12]), however, these studies
potentially overestimate the net emissions reductions. Some
of the recent literature has acknowledged the importance of
a full life cycle perspective. Kim et al [13] addressed this
issue and developed a model to calculate a vehicle lifetime that
is optimal in terms of minimizing life cycle energy use and
various vehicular emissions; Spitzley et al [14] built upon this
work by also exploring the optimal lifetime from an economic
standpoint, including the consumer’s ownership costs and
societal pollution costs. These two studies concluded that,
depending on the pollutant or economic effect being prioritized
and a vehicle’s annual miles traveled, optimal lifetime could
range from 2 to 19 years.
Van Wee et al [15] similarly suggested that assessments
of scrappage programs need to include full vehicle life cycle
effects. Using fuel efficiency data from vehicles in The
Netherlands, they estimated an optimal vehicle lifetime that
balanced the energy use from operation with the energy
use from production and disposal. They concluded that
encouragement of accelerated vehicle retirement in The
Netherlands might not actually reduce overall energy use or
resulting emissions. Allan et al [16] reviewed characteristics
of many vehicle scrappage programs from North America and
Europe, demonstrating how program design could affect GHG
emission reductions. They also advocated for the use of a
life cycle framework, and proposed a formula to evaluate the
minimum improvement in fuel economy between trade-in and
replacement vehicles necessary to result in a net emissions
reduction after taking into account the emissions from new
vehicle production.
Despite the recognition that analyses of vehicle retirement
programs should account for vehicle life cycle emissions, there
has not yet been a study of CARS which fully includes this
effect. In fact, the US Government Accountability Office [17]
has criticized NHTSA for its failure to account for life cycle
effects in its assessment of the program. We have developed a
more comprehensive model to fill this gap in the literature by
assessing the greenhouse gas impact of CARS across the full
vehicle life cycle.
2. Methodology
2.1. Life cycle system definition
The life cycle GHG emissions impact of vehicles can be
analyzed by separately considering the fuel cycle and the
vehicle production and disposal cycle (figure 1). The fuel
cycle is made up of an upstream ‘well-to-tank’ portion,
which includes feedstock recovery and transportation, and
fuel production and transportation; and the ‘tank-to-wheel’
portion, which accounts for the combustion of the fuel in the
vehicle during use [18]. The ‘tank-to-wheel’ or combustion
phase accounts for approximately 80% of total fuel cycle GHG
emissions from gasoline [19]. The vehicle production and
2
Environ. Res. Lett. 5 (2010) 044003 S M Lenski et al
Figure 2. Vehicle replacement schedules with and without CARS, across a fixed ‘time’ period as measured in vehicle miles traveled (VMT).
Circles represent production and disposal of vehicles. Our analysis is limited in scope to the emissions attributable during the lifespan of
vehicle 1 and vehicle 2CARS, through mile x1 + x2.
disposal cycle includes material extraction, processing, and
fabrication; component production; vehicle assembly; end-
of-life management; and the transportation of goods between
these phases [18]. The vehicle production and disposal cycle
contributes about 10%–20% of the total vehicle life cycle
greenhouse gas emissions [18, 20, 21].
2.2. Modeling the effects of CARS on the life cycle system
The greenhouse gas impact of CARS is modeled in a two-
step process. First, the impact of the program on the vehicle
life cycle system is determined, so that the system may
be compared with and without the program; next, those
differences are used to calculate the emissions attributable to
CARS.
2.2.1. Life cycle system with CARS. The schematic in
figure 2(a) represents the life cycle of three successive vehicles,
owned by one consumer, under the CARS scenario. The
horizontal axis represents the number of vehicle miles traveled
(VMT). The uppermost line represents the life cycle of
vehicle 1, owned by the consumer prior to announcement of
the CARS program. The circles represent the greenhouse gas
emissions from production and disposal of that vehicle, p1 and
d1. The length of the bar represents the miles driven by that
vehicle, at fuel economy m1.
Under this scenario, the consumer drives x1 miles on the
original vehicle, and then trades it in through CARS, using
the rebate to purchase a new vehicle, vehicle 2CARS. Over
its lifetime, vehicle 2CARS produces emissions associated with
production and disposal, p2CARS and d2CARS, and is driven x2
miles at fuel economy m2CARS before its own end of life. (We
assume that, without an incentive such as CARS to retire a
vehicle early, the end of a vehicle life is determined by miles
traveled, x2.) At that time, the consumer would purchase the
next vehicle, and so on.
Only the retirement of vehicle 1 and the purchase of
vehicle 2CARS are affected by CARS, due to the short-term
nature of this program. Therefore, the scope of analysis for
this system is from mile zero on vehicle 1 to the end of the life
of vehicle 2CARS, which occurs at mile x1 + x2. This area is
shaded in figure 2.
2.2.2. Life cycle system without CARS. Figure 2(b) represents
the life cycle of three successive vehicles without the CARS
incentive program, the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario from
which we calculate the differential impact of CARS.
Vehicle 1 in this scenario is the same as vehicle 1 under
the scenario with CARS. Its production, disposal, and fuel
economy (p1, d1, and m1) are the same as described above.
The lack of an incentive to retire the vehicle early, however,
means that vehicle 1 is driven for x2 miles, the expected life of
a vehicle, before it is retired and replaced with vehicle 2BAU.
Vehicle 2BAU may or may not be the same model
vehicle as the consumer purchases under the CARS incentive,
vehicle 2CARS. Because of the requirement to purchase
a vehicle that meets certain fuel economy standards under
CARS, vehicle 2BAU may be a less fuel-efficient model than
vehicle 2CARS. Vehicle 2BAU is driven for an expected lifetime
of x2 miles before being retired and replaced with a third
vehicle, and so on through the consumer’s life. Once again,
3
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Table 1. Key sources of emissions differences with and without CARS.
Effect Part of Description
1 Fuel cycle ‘Clunker’ retired early, and miles remaining in its natural life instead driven in new,
more fuel-efficient vehicle.
2 Fuel cycle New vehicle purchased under CARS more fuel-efficient than consumer’s next new
vehicle would have been.
3 Vehicle production and disposal cycle Premature retirement of ‘clunker’ and manufacture of new vehicle under CARS
cause additional production and disposal emissions.
Table 2. Summary characteristics of vehicles traded in through CARS. (Note. Source: [1]. Average fuel economy is calculated as fleet










Passenger car 102 638 17.5 152 401 16.6
Category 1 light truck 447 505 15.9 158 339 14.0
Category 2 light truck 119 394 14.1 172 068 16.2
Category 3 light truck 7 544 14.1a 185 948 16.3
Total/average 677 081 15.7 160 167 14.8
a Not available. Assumed same as category 2 light trucks.
the scope of our analysis goes only through x1 + x2 miles,
represented by the shaded area in figure 2(b).
2.2.3. Characterizing system differences with and without
CARS. The systems characterized in figure 2 suggest three
sources of emissions differences with and without CARS
(table 1). First, between miles x1 and x2, the vehicle driven
by a consumer who participates in CARS (vehicle 2CARS) is
more fuel-efficient than the vehicle driven in the absence of
CARS (vehicle 1). This is the fuel economy effect modeled
in most previous analyses. Second, vehicle 2CARS may be
more fuel-efficient than vehicle 2BAU, a benefit that accrues
for all miles driven between x2 and x1 + x2. Third, within
our time scope, the consumer who participates in CARS has
been responsible for the production and disposal of two full
vehicles. Without CARS, that consumer would have only
been responsible for the production and disposal of vehicle 1,
and a portion of the production and disposal of vehicle 2BAU
(we allocate production and disposal impacts by VMT). The
first two effects described above relate to emissions from the
fuel cycle, whereas the third effect takes place in the vehicle
production and disposal cycle.
The extra vehicle cycle emissions created through CARS
occur because of somewhat earlier production and purchase
of the second vehicle. Importantly, though, those emissions
as modeled here are not simply inevitable emissions shifted
in time. A portion of the emissions from the production
and disposal are incremental emissions that would not have
occurred without CARS. If figure 2 were extended out
indefinitely, the consumer who participated in CARS would
always be responsible for the production of a partial additional
vehicle compared to a consumer who did not participate in
CARS. Those emissions are the ones we model here.
Defining the following variables, we model the impact
of each effect for a single vehicle: pi = GHG emissions
resulting from production of vehicle i , for i = 1, 2CARS, 2BAU;
di = GHG emissions resulting from disposal of vehicle i , for
i = 1, 2CARS, 2BAU; mi = fuel economy (mpg) of vehicle i ,
for i = 1, 2CARS, 2BAU; E = GHG emissions (upstream and
combustion) per gallon of fuel; x1 = lifetime VMT of vehicle
retired early due to CARS program; x2 = lifetime VMT of
vehicle retired at end of natural life.




















The incremental emissions attributable to Effect 3 can be
expressed as:
p2CARS + d2CARS − x1
x2
(p2BAU + d2BAU). (3)
The sum of Effect 1 and Effect 2, minus Effect 3, equals the






















We calculate the program’s total GHG emissions impact based
on the average vehicle in CARS, multiplied by 677 081, the
total number of participating vehicles.
2.3. Data sources and assumptions for empirical analysis
2.3.1. Official statistics on CARS. The Department of
Transportation (DOT) published data for the vehicles that were
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Table 3. Summary characteristics of new vehicles purchased
through CARS. (Note. Source: [1]. Average fuel economy is






Passenger car 397 182 27.9
Category 1 light truck 230 220 21.6
Category 2 light truck 47 425 16.2
Category 3 light truck 2 254 16.2a
Total/average 677 081 24.2
a Not available. Assumed same as category 2 light
trucks.
traded in and purchased through CARS. These data (tables 2
and 3) include number of vehicles by type (passenger car
and three categories of light trucks), odometer reading and
age of traded-in vehicles, and fuel economy. Average fuel
economy (m1) and odometer reading (x1) of traded-in vehicles
were 15.7 mpg and 160 167 miles, respectively. Average fuel
economy of new vehicles (m2CARS) was 24.2 mpg. As tables 2
and 3 show, in addition to fuel economy improvements in each
vehicle category, some improvement can also be attributed to
a substantial number of participants trading in light trucks for
passenger cars.
2.3.2. Fuel economy in absence of CARS. Sivak and
Schoettle [22] found that fuel economy of new purchased
vehicles during CARS was up to 0.7 mpg greater than would
be predicted by their regression model based on historical
trends, and this effect can presumably be attributed to CARS’
incentives. Therefore, m2BAU is calculated as m2CARS − 0.7, or
23.5 mpg.
In the absence of CARS, many consumers would likely
have replaced their trade-in vehicle with a used vehicle,
instead of a new one. Those used vehicles may have had
substantially lower fuel economy than those purchased through
CARS, which would suggest a larger benefit than the 0.7 mpg
differential we use to model Effect 2. However, we assume
that all vehicle purchases ‘flow through’ the US fleet. Without
CARS, the consumer selling a used vehicle would have
purchased a new replacement, so that new vehicle (though it
is not actually purchased by the same consumer) is the one we
compare to the new vehicle purchased through CARS.
2.3.3. VMT in absence of CARS. Data for x2, the expected
life of a vehicle in the absence of an incentive to retire it early,
is not readily available. In previous studies, traded-in vehicles
have been estimated to have roughly three to five years of life
remaining, at an average of 12 000 miles per year [4, 6, 7];
added to the odometer reading at the time of trade-in, this
would imply total vehicle lifetimes of about 196 000–220 000
miles. For two reasons discussed below, we suspect these
estimates are too high, and therefore overestimate the avoided
GHG emissions.
First, three to five years of additional use remaining on
the ‘clunkers’ may be an overestimate. According to a DOT
survey, participants would have kept their vehicles for, on
average, another 2.52 years without CARS, and half intended
to keep them for less than two years [23].
Second, although a typical US vehicle is driven about
12 000 miles per year [24], annual VMT tends to decrease with
vehicle age, so CARS trade-ins should have been driven less
than the average. In the DOT survey, participants indicated
they drove their vehicles on average 9412 miles in the year
prior to CARS [8], close to what standard VMT schedules
would predict for 14–16 year old cars and trucks (table 4).
Further, VMT decreases at 4.33% per year, on average, for
15–20 year old vehicles (table 4).
Assuming 9412 VMT per year, decreasing at 4.33% per
year for 2.52 years, vehicles had about 21 904 miles remaining
at the time of trade-in. This implies a total expected lifetime of
174 305 miles for passenger cars; 180 243 miles for category 1
light trucks; 193 972 miles for category 2 light trucks; and
207 852 miles for category 3 light trucks. We used the
weighted average lifetime VMT (x2) of 182 071 miles.
2.3.4. Calculating greenhouse gas emissions. Emissions
factors from GREET models 1.8c.0 and 2.7 [18] were used to
calculate fuel cycle and vehicle cycle emissions, respectively.
The fuel cycle model provided an estimate for our emissions
factor, E , of 0.011 17 metric tons CO2-e per gallon of fuel. The
vehicle cycle model provided data for CO2-e emissions from
vehicle production and disposal for passenger cars (7.8 metric
tons) and light trucks (10.1 metric tons). Weighted by the
number of vehicles in each category, we used a value of
9.76 metric tons for the sum of our variables p2 and d2. For
simplicity and lack of data, we assume that a consumer who
wanted a light truck in the absence of CARS would not have
purchased a passenger car as a result of CARS and vice versa,
so that broad vehicle class is the same between vehicle 2 under
either scenario. Therefore, in our modeling, p2CARS = p2BAU
and d2CARS = d2BAU.
Table 4. VMT schedule used to estimate miles remaining for CARS trade-in vehicles. (Note. Source: [25].)
Vehicle age Passenger cars VMT  Light trucks VMT 
14 9633 — 10 396 —
15 9249 −3.99% 9 924 −4.54%
16 8871 −4.09% 9 468 −4.59%
17 8502 −4.16% 9 032 −4.60%
18 8144 −4.21% 8 619 −4.57%
19 7799 −4.24% 8 234 −4.47%
20 7469 −4.23% 7 881 −4.29%
Average  across cars and light trucks: −4.33%
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Figure 3. Reduction in CO2-e emissions as a result of CARS. Effects 1, 2, and 3 are as defined in table 1.
3. Results
3.1. Findings
Using equation (4), we calculate that CARS reduced
greenhouse gas emissions by 4.4 million metric tons CO2-e.
As shown in figure 3, the improved fuel economy of CARS
replacement vehicles compared to the ‘clunkers’ (Effect 1)
reduced emissions by about 3.7 million metric tons (83% of net
emissions reductions); the improved fuel economy of CARS
replacement vehicles compared to non-CARS replacement
vehicles (Effect 2) reduced emissions by about 1.5 million
metric tons (35%); and the premature production and disposal
of vehicles (Effect 3) increased emissions by about 800 000
metric tons (−18%).
Overall, through the lifetime of vehicle 1 and vehi-
cle 2CARS (the shaded area in figure 2(a)), the 677 081
‘clunkers’ and new vehicles participating in CARS were
responsible for just over 146 million metric tons of CO2-e
emissions. Without CARS, under the scenario modeled in
figure 2(b) for the same number of miles (in the shaded area),
those vehicles would have produced nearly 151 million metric
tons of emissions. The 4.4 million metric tons of CO2-e
avoided through CARS, therefore, represent a 2.9% savings
over the business-as-usual emissions without the program.
3.2. Modeling limitations and sensitivities
3.2.1. CAFE standards. The modeling of Effect 2 is based
on a study comparing new vehicle purchases in July and
August to what they would have been, in those months, without
the program. However, most vehicle 2BAU purchases would
have actually occurred several months to several years later.
But new, stricter Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
standards take effect in model year 2012 [26], consequently,
any vehicle purchases that were moved forward from model
year 2012 to the summer of 2009 may have had a net negative
impact on the vehicle’s fuel economy.
According to the DOT consumer survey, 31% of
consumers planned to keep their vehicles for at least another
three years [23], at which point the replacement vehicle would
have been subject to the new CAFE standards. 2012 standards
are 5.8 mpg higher than 2009 standards for passenger cars
(33.3 versus 27.5), and 2.3 mpg higher for light trucks (25.4
versus 23.1) [26, 27]. We modeled the impact if 31% of
passenger cars and light trucks purchased through CARS
(vehicle 2CARS) were, respectively, 5.8 and 2.3 mpg less
fuel-efficient than vehicle 2BAU. Under this scenario, CARS
prevents only about 750 000 metric tons of CO2-e emissions in
total.
3.2.2. Remaining vehicle lifetime. As in prior studies, the
total program impact is sensitive to assumptions about miles
remaining. We based our calculation of 21 904 miles remaining
per vehicle on the average miles driven in the year prior to
CARS (9412) and the average number of years consumers
stated they would have kept their vehicles in the absence of
CARS (2.52). There was, however, considerable variability in
consumers’ responses to these questions, especially the latter,
which had a standard deviation of 2.95 years. Moreover, the
question about years of use remaining asked when consumers
were planning to ‘trade-in, sell or dispose of’ their vehicle [28];
vehicles that would have been traded in or sold may have
had more years of use remaining than indicated in the survey.
Table 5 shows the sensitivity of emissions avoided through
CARS to the assumption about mileage remaining for the
average vehicle.
3.2.3. Replacement vehicle miles traveled. Our analysis
assumes that replacement vehicles under CARS are driven the
same number of miles, annually, as the vehicles they replace.
However, new vehicles might be driven more than their
predecessors. First, participants may experience a rebound
effect, in which improved fuel economy reduces the per-mile
cost of driving, resulting in more miles traveled. Recent
literature examining the empirical evidence for the rebound
effect [29–31] indicates that up to about 10% of energy savings
could be offset by an increase in miles traveled; this value is
also utilized by NHTSA [26]. For this study, including a 10%
rebound effect would reduce the net avoided emissions of the
program from 4.4 to 3.9 million metric tons.
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Table 5. Sensitivity of overall program results to assumptions about
miles remaining on trade-in in the absence of an early retirement
incentive.








a We use 21 904 miles in our calculations, which is
based on the average 2.52 years remaining from the
DOT consumer survey.
b One-half standard deviation above the mean in the
survey data would equal 4 years remaining, or 33 744
miles.
Alternatively, some participants may drive the new CARS
vehicle more but conserve total household VMT by reducing
driving in another household vehicle. The impact this could
have on GHG emissions depends on the characteristics of the
household’s other vehicles and the number of miles substituted,
for which data is not available. However, as long as the new
CARS vehicle has better fuel economy than other household
vehicles, this substitution would slightly increase the emissions
savings attributable to the program.
3.2.4. Longer-term behavior change. Our analysis assumes
that the short-term incentive provided by CARS results in only
short-term behavior change, that is, the purchase of a more
fuel-efficient vehicle with the rebate funds. If the program
helped to stimulate longer-term environmental consciousness
in participating consumers, influencing their choice of vehicle,
driving habits, or even non-transportation behaviors after the
program ended, the impact in terms of emissions savings
could be much larger than calculated here. Previous research
has shown that some accelerated retirement programs can
help shift consumer vehicle preferences [32], however, more
research on the behavioral impact of CARS is needed [33].
4. Discussion
CARS had a moderately positive impact on emissions, causing
a one-time reduction in life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of
about 4.4 million metric tons, or just under 0.4% of total annual
US light-duty vehicle emissions [34]. This assessment takes
into account the full life cycle impact of the program, from
vehicle manufacturing and disposal to use-phase combustion
and upstream fuel cycle emissions.
These avoided emissions are lower than those of other
authors who have assessed the impact of CARS. Abrams
and Parsons [4, 5] expressed findings in terms of gallons
of gasoline saved, but using the GREET model emissions
factor, we can convert this to an implied 6.4 million metric
tons CO2-e avoided. Knittel [7] estimated per-vehicle CO2
avoided, but only based on combustion-phase emissions, and
without including other GHGs; adjusting his estimates to
include upstream fuel cycle (20% of total) and other GHG
(5% of total) emissions, his analysis would suggest 9.0 million
metric tons CO2-e avoided. Similarly, Sachs [6] calculated per-
vehicle CO2 avoided, without upstream fuel or non-CO2 GHG
emissions. A fuller accounting of Sachs’ assumptions implies
10.7 million metric tons CO2-e avoided. Finally, as mentioned
above, NHTSA [8] estimated savings of 9.5 million metric
tons CO2-e avoided, including emissions avoided from the
upstream fuel cycle, and including the benefit from consumers
purchasing more fuel-efficient vehicles under CARS than they
otherwise would have.
Our findings of 4.4 million metric tons avoided range
from about 30% to 60% lower than these previous studies,
for several reasons. The differences are driven in large part
by our assumption that traded-in vehicles had about 22 000
miles remaining, for reasons described in section 2. Most other
studies assumed, without justification, substantially longer
remaining lives—as much as 60 000 miles, for example, in
Sachs [6]—though some acknowledged they used generous
assumptions. Since emissions avoided from Effect 1 scale
with the assumption of miles remaining in the old vehicle’s
life, these assumptions play a large role in the total impact
calculated. Moreover, none of the other studies included the
increase in emissions attributable to Effect 3, which in our
study accounted for an 18% decrease in net emissions avoided.
NHTSA’s calculations were based on more detailed
consumer survey data than is available to the public at this
time, but there appear to be two fundamental differences in
methodology. First, NHTSA assumed an increase in VMT
on the new vehicle compared to the old one. We discuss
this possibility in section 3.2.3. Second, and perhaps most
importantly, NHTSA, like all other studies discussed, did
not include the negative emissions impact from premature
production and disposal of vehicles.
CARS was intended to serve several purposes, not least
of which was stimulating the economy (and in particular the
automotive sector). NHTSA [8] estimated that CARS provided
for the creation of more than 38 000 direct jobs and many
more indirect jobs, and that it contributed $4–$8 billion to
the gross domestic product (GDP). However, if we consider
CARS simply for its GHG emission reductions, setting aside
those economic stimulus benefits, it would appear to be an
extremely expensive way to mitigate GHGs. The program
cost about $3 billion in taxpayer money, meaning the public
cost for each metric ton of avoided GHGs was well over $600.
This is particularly high when compared to the estimated $13
price tag for a metric ton of CO2-e emissions reduction under
the proposed American Clean Energy and Security Act of
2009 [35].
Considering the high cost and moderate GHG emissions
reductions from CARS, we believe there is considerable work
to be done to ensure that future accelerated vehicle retirement
programs provide GHG emissions benefits at a reasonable cost.
Our analysis shows that it is important for policymakers to
consider the full life cycle impact of programs encouraging
early retirement, including the effect of early production and
disposal of vehicles. We also believe coordinating the timing
of these programs with a regime of increasing fuel economy
requirements is critical, as we showed that a program occurring
shortly before improved fuel economy standards take effect
7
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could negate most of its benefits by encouraging new purchases
before stricter standards are in place.
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